Behind the scenes of the Hezbollah War

Founded essentially as a Christian homeland in the 1920s, intricate power-sharing arrangements among the various communities in Lebanon’s religiously pluralistic state offered a formula to forge unity from diversity. Led and dominated by the Christian Maronite elites, Lebanon was vibrant and liberal, projecting a civic polity, a rich cultural tapestry, sophisticated banking institutions. Lebanon enjoyed a unique status among the Arab-Muslim regimes and societies in the surrounding Middle East.

Lebanon lost its way decades ago. This was not primarily due to inter-sectarian rivalries, despite the conventional opinion that the Lebanese are not a people but a composite of conflicting confessions. There was exceedingly more integration and cooperation between Christian and Muslim (Sunni and Shi’a) political classes than generally acknowledged. The so-called Civil War erupted in 1975, and pitted initially and predominantly the alien and armed Palestinian Arabs against the historic native Lebanese Christians of the land.

Over the years, external forces promoting aggressive and expansionist ideologies shook the balance among the communities and crushed Lebanon’s independence. Countries sapping and sabotaging the soul and sovereignty of Lebanon included Egypt in the ’50s, Palestinian Arabs from the ’60s, Syria from the ’70s, and Iran from the ’80s. Lebanon was overwhelmed and enfeebled, as Damascus imposed presidents and policies on Beirut and the “Switzerland of the Middle East” became a vassal of Tehran.

The war Hezbollah started against Israel on October 8, 2023, brought all the ambiguity and fragility of Lebanon to a head. After a lengthy political impasse and the extensive effects of the war on the country, Lebanon may finally turn the crisis into an opportunity.

HEZBOLLAH AND GUNS

Charismatic Shiite religious personalities subject to Iran’s ideological leadership enabled Hezbollah to grab the reins of power in Lebanon. The radicalized Shiite sect entered into a revolutionary mode, vehemently anti-American and abundantly armed, fighting jihad against Israel and challenging the Christians in Lebanon’s political hierarchy.

Hezbollah carried out assassinations of its political rivals with impunity – the murder of Sunni Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005, orchestrated by Syria, was the most notorious case. Syrian hegemony over Lebanon assured that Hezbollah would retain its weaponry according to the 1989 Ta’if Agreement. Serving as a submissive Iranian proxy, Hezbollah assumed the proportions of a ‘state within a state’, with all the paraphernalia of social, financial, and health services, and grew to becoming a far more formidable military organization than the national Lebanese Armed Forces. Hezbollah proved the validity of the motto that “power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”

In May 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak decided to end the IDF’s military presence in south Lebanon, which began with the First Lebanese War in 1982. A foolhardy precipitate Israeli withdrawal facilitated the so-called Shiite “resistance” (al-muqawama), a senior partner with the Lebanese state, to seize total control of events in the Lebanese-Israeli military theatre and prepare for war.

UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS

Hezbollah consistently refused to disarm and allow the state, in Max Weber’s definition, “to possess a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.” Christians, Sunnis, and Druze, were helpless in the face of Hezbollah’s categorical assertion: “We will never disarm.” Hezbollah was likewise adamant through its political machinations for the last two years to prevent the choosing of a president for the woeful republic.

The United Nations entered into the Lebanese quagmire at various turns to extricate the country from stagnation and paralysis. Neutralizing Hezbollah, rolling back its virtual seizure of south Lebanon, was to be the essential goal. Three examples illuminate this point:

*UNSC Res. 520 from Sept. 17, 1982, after the assassination of president-elect Bashir Gemayel, aimed to assist Lebanon to function “under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon through the Lebanese Army throughout Lebanon.” The UNIFIL Observer Force was to play a role in this effort. Hezbollah simply defied the UN.

*UNSC Res. 1559, Sept. 2, 2004, while Syrian forces still remained on Lebanese soil, called for “the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.” The following year the Syrian army withdrew from Lebanon. Hezbollah ignored the UN with impunity.

*UNSC Res. 1701 from Aug. 11, 2006, after the Second Lebanese War, called for a cease-fire with a comprehensive solution based, besides prohibiting Hezbollah’s presence south of the Litani River, on “the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon.” Hassan Nasrallah responded that Hezbollah will not disarm, offering the disingenuous reason that the militia was necessary and capable to defend Lebanon from Israeli threats. Iran rearmed Hezbollah in defiance of 1701, and UNIFIL stood by and did nothing.

TWO RESOLUTIONS: 1559 and 1701

While the mechanics of diplomacy sluggishly turned their wheels, the war between Israel and Iran’s proxies – Hamas and Hezbollah – entered its second year. From a distant political planet, Washington and Paris continued to press for a cease-fire in the Lebanese theatre. They proposed, as did Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati, the implementation of Resolution 1701, whereby Hezbollah would withdraw to north of the Litani and an invigorated UNIFIL would patrol in the south. This seemed like turning the clock back under the illusion of going forward.

Prime Minister Netanyahu reportedly rejected 1701 and advocated for 1559. The difference between the two was ostensibly the demand by 1559, not only to disarm but also to disband armed militias. Hezbollah, the sole active militia in Lebanon, would continue to function as a political party – already represented in the Lebanese legislature and government – but no longer as a bellicose belligerent in the Levant. Its dissolution as a fighting force is the sine qua non for peace to prevail between Israel and Lebanon.

WHITHER LEBANON?

We now come full circle back to the people and politics of Lebanon with which we began.

The war in the south (of Lebanon) led to the displacement of approximately one million Lebanese going northward to Beirut and beyond. An estimated one hundred thousand Lebanese crossed into Syria, while an unknown number sought refuge and perhaps a future life in Iraq and Iran. Many Syrians who had earlier come to Lebanon seeking work, or fleeing the Civil War from 2011, returned to their country.

A dynamic of population movement is under way that can enfeeble the Shiite community’s political dominance in Lebanon. Israel decapitated Hezbollah’s leadership cadre from Hassan Nasrallah down to his senior associates, and this tarnishes the image of the party and illustrates the price paid for joining its ranks.

The Shiite balance sheet records thousands dead, thousands injured, villages partly destroyed, tens of thousands impoverished, the Beirut Dahyieh headquarters in ruin. The cell phone and walkie-talkie explosions in September sowed horror in Shiite circles, and Israel bombing Hezbollah banks created havoc and financial distress in their community.

More and more Lebanese, including anti-Hezbollah Shiites, are raising their voices condemning Hezbollah for the damage and suffering that Israel has inflicted upon the common people. Hezbollah’s bravado, attacking and provoking Israel, has led to the human disaster that hit Lebanon. The wretched displaced refugees are huddling in churches and parks, sleeping in the streets. Suffering has always been a supra-existential spiritual experience for Shiites since the martyrdom of Imam ‘Ali in 680. Today suffering is an existential way of life, yet with which other communities feel little solidarity.

The present infirmity and tragedy of the Shiites strengthen the other communities. Any demographic shift, even if minor, signals a realignment among the groups to the benefit of Christians and Sunnis, the traditional political aristocracy of Lebanon’s political class.

In the past, the demographic decline of the Christians was a talking point to alter the constitutional order and electoral system. The combined Sunni – Shiite Muslim majority population resented parity of Christians and Muslims – 64 each – in parliamentary representation. Members of different communities were also offended that the office of president was allocated as an exclusive Maronite preserve. This appeared archaic and anti-democratic, though consider what a Maronite bishop once said to me: “We carry Lebanon on our shoulders…We are the mother of the baby.” This is historically true and still resonates until today.

The objective of Hezbollah, a surrogate of the Iranian axis, was to conquer and destroy the Jewish state. Islam, as a supersessionary religion, is commanded by the Koran to be triumphant over all other religions. Inasmuch as this faith continues to catalyze Hezbollah in its jihad against the Jewish state, Israel has no alternative but to fight on until victory. If not, the whole war is for naught.

Unexpectedly, the dialectic of war has now moved the momentum in a different direction – perhaps toward the liberation of Lebanon from the Shiite – Iranian hegemony and the recovery of its national poise that radiated liberty, conviviality, and creativity. The mystique of Lebanon may yet glow from the rubble of the Dahiyeh.

Dr. Mordechai Nisan, who taught Middle East Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, wrote The Conscience of Lebanon: A Political Biography of Etienne Sakr (Abu-Arz) [2003], and Politics and War in Lebanon: Unraveling the Enigma [2015].

Reposted with author's permission from Frontpage magazine.