As reported in the media, Egypt has recently signed an agreement to purchase the Chinese-manufactured J-10 “Dragon” fighter. Although Egypt’s acquisition of this 4th generation fighter will not, in and of itself, pose a serious threat to Israel’s aerial superiority, Beijing’s decision to equip the Egyptian J-10s with its PL-15 beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air missile does constitute an extremely troubling development. Making things worse, there are unconfirmed reports that China has agreed to let Egypt manufacture the PL-15, which would allow the Egyptian Air Force to equip many of its other fighters with the long-range missile. At the present time, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) employs the Derby BVR air-to-air missile with a range of approximately 50km and the US-supplied Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) that has an estimated range of around 64km. The PL-15, in contrast, has an engagement range of between 200-300km. What this means is that our fighters will be at a serious disadvantage when going up against Egyptian warplanes armed with the PL-15. The following represents two scenarios that demonstrate what this type of engagement disparity could mean if a war were to erupt between Egypt and Israel. Given the fact that Egypt has illegally built forward airbases in Sinai, PL-15-equipped Egyptian fighters operating from these facilities could theoretically engage Israeli fighters taking off from the Ramon Airbase the minute they’re airborne. The PL-15 would also grant Egyptian fighters the ability to push our Airborne Warning and Control aircraft far away from our frontier with Egypt, thereby denying our fighters a clear understanding of exactly where enemy fighters are located. Lastly, assuming PL-15-equipped Egyptian fighters provided cover for a strike coming in from the sea targeting our strategic infrastructure sites, the Egyptians just might be able to successfully drop gravity bombs or launch cruise missiles against our coastal power stations. Obviously, knocking even one of them out could inflict incalculable harm on our state. So, what could we do to neutralize the PL-15? One simple solution would involve asking the US if we could purchase their new AIM-174B air-to-air missile. This missile, which is an air-launched version of the US Navy’s SM-6 ship-launched anti-aircraft missile, has an extraordinary range of 400km. This would clearly put even a PL-15-equipped Egyptian fighter at a distinct disadvantage in an aerial engagement. We could also ask the Americans if we could co-produce under license the AIM-174B, thereby allowing us both to provide the US with an increased production rate of AIM-174Bs, while at the same time providing us with the ability to quickly equip all our F-16s and F-15s with the missile. We might even be able to construct a missile-equipped drone that would accompany our fighters into combat, providing them with the ability to launch saturation attacks against opposing Egyptian fighters. Above all else, what we have to appreciate is that the Egyptians are definitely planning to go to war with us. The J-10/PL-15 combination is one more example of just how serious they are about this intention. However, assuming we could obtain America’s AIM-174B air-to-air missile, we would be in a position to effectively stymie Egypt’s effort to neutralize our aerial advantage. This could allow us to launch a preventive strike against the Egyptian Air Force, thereby recreating the situation that guaranteed our victory in 1967.