Military analyst Yossi Yehoshua believes that the responsibility for the October 7 massacre and the ensuing war rests mostly on the military echelon. In an interview with 103FM Radio , Yehoshua explained, "The absolute majority of responsibility is on the IDF. Different handling by the General Staff's echelon on that night would have prevented most of the incident. It is not connected to the identity of the prime minister." Regarding the war in Gaza, he added, "We are advancing in Rafah, we have 70% of the Philadelphi Corridor. We should be, eight months after the war began, with even better results against Hamas and dismantling its abilities." Slamming the management of the war, he said, "We should have finished the incident there a long time ago - months ago - and placed much greater military pressure on Hamas." He did not raise the issue of American pressure and arms shipments. Related articles: Defense of Erez Crossing severely failed 'I didn’t foresee the brutal attack' I saw the truth, so I couldn’t stay silent on antisemitism Bereaved families demand a public inquiry committee In February , Kan News reported that dozens of Israeli SIM cards had been activated before the Hamas invasion reached the commander of the IDF Southern Command in the last hours of October 6th. The first telephone call about the report took place between the Southern Command intelligence commander and Yaron Finkelman, the general commander, a few hours before midnight. The call was based on information and evidence from the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) regarding the SIM cards being activated. Finkelman canceled his vacation in northern Israel and returned to his command. A few hours later, another intelligence service sent even more suspicious findings. The intelligence officer received the information and reported it to Finkelman immediately. In the first weeks following the invasion, another report claimed that Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and other commanding generals held at least two consultations over the course of that night. The first consultation was in the early hours of the night, following reports of initial indications from the field. It was decided to hold a second consultation later and not to send additional forces to the area. During the second consultation, it was decided to hold a third consultation in the morning, and that no forces would be sent to the area and the forces present would not be placed on higher alert. The ISA likewise understood that something was afoot. ISA director Ronen Bar made his way to ISA headquarters that night and remained there until the war broke out. In a joint statement, the IDF and ISA claimed, "Reports that 1,000 Israeli SIM cards were activated simultaneously are false and far from the truth. In point of fact, a set of evidence showed that only a few dozen were activated, all of which had been activated in previous incidents. In light of this, the system was prepared and intelligence and operational actions were carried out.” “As has been reported previously, on the eve of October 7th, information was received due to which assessments were held and decisions were made. The evidence was based on a number of different tools and techniques, including technological tools, the nature and operation of which cannot be discussed. All the incidents and information available about that night will be investigated by the investigative departments of the ISA and IDF. We must be responsible and careful in publications so that they do not impede operational techniques and capabilities during the war.”
