Dr. Salem AlKetbiis a UAE political analyst
Iran has vowed revenge against Israel for the elimination of Hamas political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, on which Israel has not commented.
On Saturday, the IRGC's Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi emphasized that the Iranian response is "certain," but added that it will be carried out at a time when Iran deems appropriate.
Iran and Israel tacitly acknowledge that direct military confrontation would have devastating consequences for both countries, effectively ruling out the possibility of a full-scale war. Iran, however, appears to be seeking a face-saving exit from the crisis precipitated by the assassination of Hamas terror group’s political bureau chief on its soil. This event is a historic humiliation that will likely haunt the Iranian regime indefinitely.
Claims about the Iranian regime’s desire to maintain credibility are misplaced, as this credibility has long since eroded. It’s widely recognized in the region and beyond that the regime’s repeated threats following attacks on its political and military leaders, as well as researchers and experts, are primarily for domestic consumption and quickly fade from international attention.
We must recognize that Haniyeh’s assassination, while significant, does not outweigh the impact of other recent events affecting Iran’s leadership.
-It is less consequential than the death of former Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash with yet undetermined causes.
-It also carries less strategic weight than the killing of General Qasem Soleimani, who was effectively second-in-command to the Supreme Leader in practical terms.
-Even the assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the architect of Iran’s nuclear program, was arguably more impactful given the program’s strategic importance to the regime.
Therefore, it is misguided to assume Iran would risk a catastrophic all-out war with Israel over Haniyeh’s death. To the Iranian regime, he was essentially a Palestinian Arab operative serving Iranian interests. The current situation likely involves Iran searching for a response scenario that allows it to claim vengeance and fulfill its threats, while crucially avoiding any Israeli counter-response that could further embarrass the regime or push it into an even more precarious position.
The question that arises for an observer is:
Does the Iranian regime favor tactical silence and temporary disengagement while concentrating on accelerating its nuclear program’s militarization?
Is Iran aiming to acquire a nuclear weapon within the two to three weeks suggested by recent American estimates?
At present, Iran’s leadership may view acquiring a nuclear deterrent as a transformative achievement. Such a capability could significantly dissuade Israel from repeating actions against main figures like Haniyeh and other Iran-affiliated mercenaries, both militant and civilian. The regime likely sees nuclear armament as a means to restore Iran’s prestige and national pride, while also shifting focus away from Israeli operations against Iranian personnel or allied operatives.
The mullahs may calculate that keeping Israel and Western powers in suspense over Iran’s potential reactions serves their interests. They might aim to capitalize on current geopolitical tensions by unexpectedly announcing military nuclear capabilities, justifying this step as necessary self-defense against perceived Israeli threats.
An analysis of available evidence suggests that pursuing the nuclear option may align closely with the strategic thinking of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his inner circle. This path appears increasingly viable given Iran’s current circumstances and capabilities. Acquiring nuclear weapons could provide the regime with a powerful tool to maintain internal stability and deter potential Israeli military actions. It would allow Tehran to bolster claims about the strength of its “axis of resistance,” which could then be framed as a nuclear-capable alliance.
Such a development would likely deliver a significant strategic shock to Israel and severely constrain the options of any incoming US administration, including a potential Trump administration. The prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran would complicate, if not paralyze, Washington’s ability to credibly threaten or execute military actions against Iran, whether limited or full-scale.
The overall strategic gains that Iran could reap if it resorts to activating the nuclear option represent a real strategic catastrophe for Israel and the rest of the Middle East countries. It represents out-of-the-box thinking to respond to Israel’s attempt to curb Iran’s regional influence, whether by assassinating one of its mercenaries, Haniyeh, in its own backyard or directing painful strikes against its terrorist militia arms.
Despite its strategic allure, Iran’s pursuit of the nuclear option carries significant risks, constraints, and complexities. The decision to proceed is contingent upon crucial factors, primarily the stances of China and Russia. Their support for Iran’s nuclear ambitions, both in international forums and behind closed doors, is pivotal. Beijing and Moscow’s positions are shaped by their own strategic calculus, including their long-term vision for relations with Iran and the role Tehran might play in their strategies concerning global competition and the struggle for influence in the 21st century.
A critical factor is Iran’s actual capability to translate its accumulated technical knowledge and enriched uranium stockpiles into a functional nuclear weapon, even at an experimental level. Reliable information on Iran’s technical capabilities is scarce, with primarily American and Israeli intelligence estimates suggesting Iran could reach this stage in as little as two weeks. However, the accuracy of these assessments hinges on actual data, not on deliberate leaks from Iran or potentially exaggerated claims about the Iranian threat.
This is particularly relevant given the known weaknesses and decline of various Iranian institutions, coupled with Iran’s tendency for hyperbole, especially regarding military capabilities. These factors necessitate a cautious approach when evaluating both intelligence estimates and Iranian reports, which often lean towards propaganda. A measured assessment of Iran’s true nuclear capabilities is essential for understanding the realistic timeline and implications of its nuclear program.
There is another challenge related to the inability of the Iranian regime to announce reaching the nuclear threshold and joining the club of nuclear powers without sufficient and convincing evidence that achieves the desired deterrence in the Iranian case.
It is not possible to claim achieving this development if unproven, either because the price of lying and deception would be costly, or because there is a potential political/strategic bill that must be borne as a direct reaction to what a nuclear Iran represents as a major real threat to regional and international security and stability.
