After Assad: Recalibrating risks of an Israel-Iran nuclear war

Special to Israel National News

At first glance, the fall of Syria’s Assad dictatorship was net-gainful for Israel. Nonetheless, Iran’s military nuclearization continues to accelerate, and the Islamic leadership in Tehran has no credible reason to fear a Damascus sort of regime change. On the contrary, this Iranian leadership is now subject to new worries about being “cornered” by Israel during various crises of competitive risk-taking. In turn, these historically-unprecedented worries could heighten the likelihood of an inadvertent nuclear war with the Jewish State, even while Iran remained pre-nuclear.

There is more. A new and unpredictable cadre of jihadist terrorists is already rising in post-Assad Syria. Though Hezbollah, Houthi and other Shiite insurgents are now clearly less of a threat to Israel, these Sunni terror groups (

1) are being fashioned out of al-Qaeda and ISIS remnants; and

(2) are apt to engage Israel in ways that extend palpable confidence to Iran and encourage direct war against Israel.

In a very limited form, we have “seen this movie before.” The next time around, such direct war could become an “all-out” conventional conflict and sometime elicit “limited” nuclear operations by Israel. Such an asymmetrical nuclear war scenario is especially concerning in circumstances where Iran would target Israel’s Dimona nuclear reactor or employ radiation dispersal weapons against the Jewish State. In principle, at least, similar escalations could follow in the wake of Iranian resort to electromagnetic pulse (EMP) ordnance.

What about the oft-discussed option of an Israeli preemption against a still non–nuclear Iran? All things considered, the fall of Bashar al-Assad should have no calculable bearing on an Israeli preemption against Iran (an act of “anticipatory self-defense” under international law), but a singular or one-off Israeli preemption would still likely prove irrational. Only during an active and already-escalating war against Iran could Israel rationally launch multiple and mutually-reinforcing preemptive strikes.

There are additional details and nuances. In scientific terms, it is meaningless to estimate the probabilities of unique events. In extremis, however, Israel ought not allow itself to be bound by strict analytic standards of logic and mathematics. Whatever their inherent limitations, Jerusalem’s estimations of enemy capacity and intent would be necessary. Moreover, just as before the Syrian government collapse, determinable risks of an Israel-Iran nuclear war would depend on whether such a conflict was intentional, unintentional, or accidental.

What about Israel-Iran tactics of “pretended irrationality” after Assad? Foreseeably, though it is more reasonable to expect such dissembling tactics from a “cornered” Iranian side, Israel could conceivably also expect benefits from such a posture. Years ago, Moshe Dayan openly expressed pertinent hopes. Warned the IDF general and minister of defense: “Israel should be seen as a mad dog, too dangerous to bother.”[1]

An unintentional or inadvertent nuclear war between Jerusalem and Teheran could take place not only as the result of misunderstandings or miscalculations between fully rational leaders, but also as an unintended consequence of mechanical, electrical or computer malfunction. This should bring to mind a further distinction between unintentional/inadvertent nuclear war and an accidental nuclear war. Though all accidental nuclear war must be unintentional, not every unintentional nuclear war would occur by accident. An unintentional or inadvertent nuclear war could sometime be the result of certain fundamental misjudgments concerning enemy intentions.

"In war," says Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz famously in On War, "everything is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult." In fashioning a successful "endgame" to any future nuclear confrontation with Iran, Israel's leaders should understand that this sort of crisis would be about more than maximizing any relative “force-ratios.” To an unknowable but meaningful extent, it would also be about Islamic “martyrdom” hopes for “power over death.” In this regard, the ongoing re-assembly of certain Sunni terror groups in post-Assad Syria could become an enabling war factor for Iran.

As a nuclear war has never been fought, Israel will require more broadly intellectual guidance than Israel could reasonably be expected from even its most senior military officers. In essence, there are no recognizable experts on fighting a nuclear war - not in Tehran, not in Jerusalem, not anywhere. To manage its unprecedented existential problem, Israel needs “high thinkers” of Yuval Ne’eman[2] or J. Robert Oppenheimer stature.

There is a further point concerning estimable risks of an Israel-Iran nuclear war. From the standpoint of Jerusalem, the only truly successful outcome of any direct conflict would be one that ends with a slowing or prevention of Iranian nuclear war fighting capabilities and intentions. Israel ought never to incur survival risks with Tehran if the best outcome could only be status quo ante bellum. On this calculation, the fall of al-Assad should have no discernible impact except for previously-mentioned enhancements of extreme Sunni terror threats.

Whatever the changed situation in Syria, providing for Israeli national security vis-à-vis a still-nuclearizing Iran ought never to become a seat-of-the-pants "game." Without a suitably long-term and theory-based strategic plan in place, Israel could be unprepared for any Iranian nuclear conflict that is deliberate, unintentional or accidental. At every stage of its competition with Tehran, Jerusalem should keep clear sight of its only sensible rationale for maintaining absolute nuclear superiority. That rationale is reliable nuclear deterrence and (if necessary) stable war management.

What sorts of nuclear war are “in play?” By definition, any bilateral use of nuclear weapons would signify a symmetrical nuclear war, even if Israel were significantly more powerful. But if Israel was the only nuclear combatant state, an asymmetrical nuclear war could still be initiated. Either way, there is nothing about the al-Assad regime collapse in Syria that necessarily implies diminished risks of an Israel-Iran nuclear war. Accordingly, for Israel, the obligation to prevent a nuclear Iran remains conspicuous and primary.

LOUIS RENÉ BERES (Ph.D., Princeton, 1971) is Emeritus Professor of International Law at Purdue. His twelfth and most recent book is Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel's Nuclear Strategy (2016) (2nd ed., 2018)

http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/surviving-amid-chaos-israels-nuclear-strategy

In 2003-2004, Professor Beres was Chair of Project Daniel in Israel (Iran's nuclear weapons) for PM Sharon. His scholarly publications on Israel include annual contributions to Oxford University Press’ Yearbook on International Law and Jurisprudence. Professor Louis René Beres was born in Zürich at the end of World War II.

Sources: