Several weeks ago, a video of the new Syrian rebel “navy” was released. It showed a rag tag bunch of small boats cruising around trying to look like something which they weren’t: namely, a professional, well equipped naval fighting force. Although many thought the rebel naval review was comical, I definitely didn’t. Indeed, I saw it as a preview of an eventual Turkish controlled Syrian Salafi naval littoral force that might one day threaten our maritime security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. And from that perspective, there was absolutely nothing funny about the show put on by the Syrian Salafi “Navy” a couple of weeks ago. We have to keep in mind that during the Second World War, small, fast, hard hitting attack boats figured prominently in the Mediterranean theater. The Germans and Italians, in particular, employed them for such missions as torpedo attacks, mine laying, and even convoy escort. Needless to say, neither the British nor the Americans discounted the threat they posed to vessels sailing in coastal waters. Unfortunately, recent developments suggest that the danger posed by these fast attack craft is only going to be getting worse. For example, the Iranians have practiced using missile equipped fast attack craft in what’s called “swarms”, that are intended to overwhelm larger enemy warships in the constricted waters of the Persian Gulf. And according to published reports, the Iranians are planning to coordinate their swarm attacks with volleys of land based anti ship cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and Kamekazi aerial drones. If this sounds familiar, it should because the Houthis have been carrying out such coordinated attacks over the past year against merchant shipping and western naval vessels in the southern Red Sea. According to on-scene U.S. Navy commanders, these attacks have been increasingly difficult to defeat due to their complexity. More to the point, defending against these Houthi attacks has cost the American navy a veritable fortune in defensive interceptors. Adding to this type of littoral threat are the USVs or unmanned surface vessels that the Ukrainians have been successfully using against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Just recently, one of these Ukrainian drone boats even managed to shoot down a Russian helicopter with a modified air-to-air missile! Not surprisingly, the Ukrainians are currently trying out the use of drone swarms that should present what’s left of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet with an even bigger problem to deal with. So, what does all this mean as far as the possibility of a potential Syrian Salafi coastal threat in the Eastern Mediterranean? First of all, it’s important to see this issue within the context of Turkey’s so-called “Blue Homeland” doctrine. Like Mussolini’s “Mare Nostrum” concept, which drew upon the history of Roman control of the Mediterranean to justify Fascist Italy’s dominance of this sea, the Turks, with their Blue Homeland idea, are similarly trying to justify the expansion of their current maritime borders based on the Ottoman Empire’s past control of both the Central and Eastern Mediterranean. Although Erdogan’s effort to build a neo Ottoman lake out of large parts of the Mediterranean seems outlandish, let’s not kid ourselves. He’s deadly serious about it. Indeed, judging by the large sums of money Erdogan is spending on expanding the Turkish Navy, it’s abundantly clear that the Blue Homeland is something he’s definitely committed to realizing. So, along with all the other threats we’re currently facing, we’re going to have to spend some time and, ultimately money, figuring out how to defeat Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman Navy before we find ourselves facing a Turkish outer blockade of our Mediterranean ports. Unfortunately, a Syrian Salafi coastal force will probably also be employed by the Turks to present a much closer threat to us in the Eastern Mediterranean. How so? Assuming the Turks intend to turn a Syrian Salafi coastal force into an auxiliary arm of the Turkish Navy, which is highly likely, the main purpose of this new Syrian Navy would be to make hit and run attacks on merchant ships en route to Haifa. It could also pose a threat to our northern most Mediterranean offshore oil and gas platforms. Another possible mission that I’m particularly concerned about could involve drawing Israeli surface combatants into a trap where they would be hit by large numbers of Turkish manufactured drone boats, missile armed manned attack craft, and shore based ballistic rockets and cruise missiles. Such a scenario could very easily occur in the northeastern Mediterranean between Cyprus and the Syrian coast. While it’s true that our naval combatants would hopefully be protected by Israeli Air Force fighter cover, these jets, as capable as they are, would also be confronted by Turkish fighters based out of northern Cyprus and possibly Syria. In addition to dealing with these threats, our fighters would also be tasked with neutralizing both any Turkish missile batteries deployed in Northern Cyprus as well as Syrian Salafi land based anti ship missile batteries. In light of these multiple problems it would have to deal with, it’s possible that our fighter cover might not be able to adequately protect an Israeli Surface Action Group if it sails into this type of maelstrom. Clearly, losing even one or two of our ships to this combination of relatively inexpensive enemy weapons would be considered an unacceptable price to pay to secure the Eastern Mediterranean. Of course, it’s possible that the IAF might be ordered to conduct a preliminary comprehensive sweep against these enemy land and sea based threats. But our navy simply can’t plan on the guaranteed availability of a sister service that may or may not be in a position to help them. On the other hand, even if we avoided projecting a large Surface Action Group into this dangerous engagement box between Cyprus and the Syrian coast, the mere existence of a possible Syrian Salafi threat to Haifa’s maritime access with the world, could very easily require our small navy to divide its resources between a Turkish outer blockade, that would somehow have to be defeated, and a Syrian Salafi naval threat from the north that could potentially shut down our principal port if it weren’t neutralized. Of course, assuming the Syrians are provided with enough Turkish drone boats to deploy a swarm, their threat level would rise appreciably. I think in order to appreciate just what kind of danger the transfer of Turkish manufactured drone boats to the Syrian Salafis could present, we need to look at a recent test of these boats by the Turkish Navy. In October 2023, the Turkish Navy successfully conducted an exercise involving an aerial drone and a swarm of naval attack drones. This combined operation targeted an empty, stationary 22-meter long merchant ship off the coast of Turkey’s Mersin province in the Eastern Mediterranean. A Bayraktar TB2 UAV provided reconnaissance while the attack swarm consisted of 3 Albatross-S USVs. The Turkish designed and built Albatross-S is 22-meters long, has a high level of autonomy, can reach speeds of over 40 knots and has an impressive cruising range of approximately 200 nautical miles. Judging by the damage it caused, the Albatross-S has obviously been equipped with a large explosive payload, which could probably sink corvette sized naval combatants or seriously damage most large merchant vessels. Clearly, the Turkish Navy is well on its way to perfecting their ability to conduct deadly coastal swarm attacks. Perhaps more troubling, though, is the fact that the Turkish Navy has also indicated a desire to carry out these attacks in coordination with volleys of land based Atmaca cruise missiles. The Atmaca is an all weather, long range, precision anti-ship cruise missile, which could significantly enhance the effectiveness of any swarm attack against enemy surface vessels. Basically, what we’ve just described is the same type of scenario the U.S. Navy would face if it went to war with Iran in the Persian Gulf. And the Americans candidly acknowledge that such a fight would definitely not be an easy one to wage. However, the Americans would not have to simultaneously deal with an outer blockade of its major ports, as we would. Looking forward, then, how must we structure our navy to successfully handle such a multifaceted Turkish and Syrian Salafi maritime threat? Although our navy’s surface strike force may be relatively well equipped for its size and staffed with excellent personnel, both its current ships and planned future acquisitions are simply too small to survive hits from either large cruise missiles or precision guided ballistic missiles. Moreover, they have inadequate weapons magazines necessary for protracted combat and are incapable of sustained operations at long range. Granted, our navy has done everything it can to deploy an impressive number of relatively short ranged surface combatants, suitable for quick strikes with accurate anti ship cruise missiles and effective, albeit limited, air defenses against aerial drones. But they are just not suitable for what the Turkish Navy is preparing to throw at them. In addition to completing a purchase of large German built corvettes, our navy has decided to replace its aging group of smaller missile boats with Reshef class corvettes. Although they represent a vast improvement over the missile boats they’re replacing, the Reshef class simply won’t be able to deal with a Turkish naval drone swarm, which is backed up by various land based anti ship missiles and manned missile equipped fast attack craft. Even with air cover and perhaps a larger corvette acting as a command ship, I wouldn’t want to send these ships into a war zone bounded by Cyprus and Syria under these threat conditions. Then, there is the “little” matter of defeating a hypothetical Turkish outer blockade. Even our larger corvettes, assisted by Israeli fighters, would have an extremely difficult time dealing with what the Turks would have waiting for them in the Central Mediterranean. Based in Tripoli, the NATO trained Turkish blockade force, consisting of frigates, destroyers, submarines, a drone carrier, land based air assets, anti-ship cruise missiles and precision ballistic missiles, would undoubtedly enjoy a distinct advantage over anything we could send against them. Admittedly, our own submarines would benefit from accurate targeting information provided by our reconnaissance satellites. But a small submarine force operating on its own may be at extreme risk from enemy ASW groups- particularly, ones trained to NATO standards. One solution to this projected war at sea against a superior Turkish Navy, would be for us to employ what’s called “asymmetrical force multipliers”. These would include a variety of land based ballistic missiles equipped with multiple precision guided maneuvering reentry warheads. These anti ship warheads could include anti radiation, high power microwave, armor piercing high explosive or depleted uranium penetrators. In addition to long range, supersonic cruise missiles fired from large unmanned underwater vehicles like the US Navy’s Orca class submarine, this asymmetrical force would also have supersonic drone bombers that could launch a mix of cruise missiles, some of which would be capable of dropping a lightweight anti ship torpedo. A number of these unmanned long range naval bombers would also serve as airborne jammers capable of blinding Turkish naval radars. Flying cover for these bombers would be autonomous air defense versions that would be capable of targeting Turkish fighters at extreme ranges. Although primarily intended to engage a Turkish outer blockade force operating in the Central Mediterranean, these unmanned bombers and submarines could also be used to target a Syrian Salafi naval littoral force based in Tartous and Latakia, quickly destroying them in their ports. They could also provide us with the ability to conduct a surprise Pearl Harbor type strike against both the Turkish Navy’s home ports as well as their forward operating base in Tripoli. One further mission that our Orcas could perform would be to lay “smart” mobile mine fields off Turkish naval bases, essentially closing them down until the end of hostilities. As far as alternative surface vessels are concerned, I would strongly urge the navy to halt the Reshef corvette program in favor of constructing a smaller, 500 ton Surface Effects Ship or SES, that would be capable of attaining speeds in excess of 50 kts. Compared to the Reshef class, this ship would have a much smaller crew, an enlarged C-Dome magazine, 4 radar controlled 30mm CIWS, 2 High Power Microwave emitters, a lightweight 4 panel AESA antenna system, and a significantly high degree of automation. Like the Reshef class, however, it would carry 8 anti ship cruise missiles. But, rather than being stuck top side, they’d be installed in pop up launch containers, flush with the deck to reduce the ship’s radar signature. These missiles would have a 500nm range and achieve supersonic speed during the terminal phase of their engagement. To enhance the missile’s effectiveness, they should have a 250 kg warhead and a last minute maneuvering capability to avoid enemy defenses. Each of these SES combatants would also have several smaller unmanned SESs accompanying them, that would be loaded with various anti ship missiles. These unmanned arsenal ships would allow our SES force to inundate an enemy formation with a massive number of missiles, some of which will have High Powered Microwave warheads designed to fry out the electronics of enemy warships. If coordinated with land based drone bombers and missiles, this proposed littoral force should be able to quickly defeat any Turkish-Syrian Salafi surface threat in the area between Cyprus and Syria. When it comes to larger warships that could contest the Central Mediterranean, our larger German built corvettes should be replaced by a new type of surface combatant that is designed for both survivability and massive firepower. I’m thinking of something along the lines of a 10,000 ton battle cruiser. Without a doubt, conventionally hulled ships are simply not appropriate. Instead, a broad catamaran type design that incorporates port and starboard pontoons equipped with multiple layers of reactive armor might be a good start. The command citadel, power plant and weapons arrays would represent an independent ship that would be able to jettison seriously damaged pontoons and continue fighting. An all electric distributed propulsion system would have to be designed that could provide power to electric motors on both the pontoons as well as the core combatant. In terms of armaments, there would have to be a high degree of specialization. However, there would be a common air defense suite installed aboard all the ships, consisting of various missile systems and BAE’s hyper velocity projectiles. These precision guided interceptors would be fired from multiple single barreled 5-inch Mark 45 auto canons, which would provide the battle cruisers with higher volumes of fire against incoming enemy missiles and expanded magazine depth. In addition, one of these capital ships would also be designed specifically for area air defense. Equipped with an exo atmospheric Arrow type anti missile system, it would provide our strike group with high altitude defense against attack by ballistic missiles. Other combatants would have 4 electrically fired VGAS 155 or 175mm Vertical Gun and Magazine modules, each capable of putting out a torrent of either land attack or anti-ship projectiles. Another strike varient might have hundreds of long range cruise missiles carrying lightweight torpedoes that would literally overwhelm the defenses an enemy formation if fired in coordination with cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Speaking of which, the Chinese Navy already deploys the YJ-21 hypersonic anti ship ballistic missile aboard some of their warships which, from what I understand, can penetrate US Navy missile defenses. Imagine one of our ships having a hundred or more of these weapons available for a combined strike against an enemy surface force. Let me point out, though, that our use of supersonic cruise missiles that can carry lightweight torpedoes would be a game changer in as much as they would allow our strike group to present an enemy force with a 3 dimensional saturation threat, which would be nearly impossible for the enemy to defend against. We have to remember that during the Second World War, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) surprised the allies with their Type 93 “Long Lance” torpedo. Fired from IJN surface combatants, the Type 93 not only benefited from a secret oxygen enhanced propulsion system that significantly reduced its wake but it also boasted a range of nearly 40 km, which far outdistanced every torpedo in the Allied inventory. Practically speaking, this gave the IJN a tremendous tactical advantage since Allied officers had no idea enemy torpedoes were on an intercept course when they tried to engage IJN warships at shorter gun ranges. Our proposal to have a long range cruise missile carry a precision lightweight torpedo intends to recreate the tactical advantages the Long Lance provided the IJN- except on a much larger scale. Even under the best of circumstances, it’s extremely difficult for surface ships to neutralize even single precision guided enemy torpedoes. We intend, however, to use the cruise missile carriers to deploy at least a hundred or more torpedoes against an enemy formation. When combined with fleet launched ballistic missiles and supersonic cruise missiles, such a multi dimensional saturation attack could not be easily repelled with current defensive technologies. Moreover, if land based precision guided missiles and AUV launched long range supersonic cruise missiles are added to this attack scenario, the odds of a successful defense being mounted by an enemy fleet become slim to none. The outcome of a culminating engagement between our battle cruiser force and a Turkish outer blockade group would, therefore, be a foregone conclusion. G-d willing, our victory over the Turkish Navy off Tripoli could then be added to such Ottoman naval defeats as Lepanto, Navarino and Cesme. Although naysayers may doubt our ability to build such a navy. I, for one, harbor no such doubts. We just have to have the courage and dedication needed to do whatever is required to achieve a decisive victory over our neo Ottoman naval opponents. With G-D’s help, we can do this!
