Recordings of a conversation between IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, Southern Command Commanding Officer Yaron Finkelman, and the local leaders from southern Israel that were published by Amit Segal on Channel 12 reveal new details about the tremendous failures on the night before the Hamas massacre on October 7th, 2023. At 8:00 on the night before the attack, after Hamas activated SIM cards that were meant to be used in the attack and after the warnings on the matter got lost among the e-mails in the military inbox, the Gaza Division realized that six commanders from Hamas's elite Nukhba Force had disappeared. After attempting to locate them, one was found, and the search was called off for the other six, who were already on their way to the staging areas from which they would invade Israel a few hours later. At 2:00 a.m. the amount of phone calls within the Gaza Strip increased significantly. The assistant to the head of the Palestinian desk in IDF intelligence asked to contact her supervisor, but because of communication problems, he only woke up four hours later. Here the intelligence failure comes into play. The intelligence soldier on duty at the Gaza Division did not have a high enough security clearance and therefore was unable to access information, which was transferred through WhatsApp messenger and not through military means. All this is in addition to the fact that at 4:35 a.m. and 5:35 a.m., the Air Force received critical intelligence which was not shared with the rest of the military. The Air Force was not aware of the other warning indications and therefore did not see a reason to share the indications that it received. The result: no one was able to piece together a full picture. Related articles: The abductee who tried to flee as terrorists took him to Gaza Outrage at disclosure of Nova report: 'Where were you? Asleep?' 'Sometimes I have to convince myself that it really happened' Defense of Erez Crossing severely failed What about the Director of the IDF Intelligence Directorate? His chief of staff, who claimed that he was on vacation and therefore did not need to be awakened, sent him a WhatsApp message at 12:40 a.m. After receiving more significant information, at 2:50, he phoned Intelligence Director Aharon Haliva who asked if the Southern Command was tending to the matter, and went back to sleep until 6:29. It was also discovered that the Intelligence Directorate did not have a human source in Gaza for the 15 years leading up to the attack and the ISA did not have an active human source in the Strip at the time either. Amidst all the chaos, the orders that were given were not executed. The Chief of Staff ordered intelligence-collecting activies to be conducted, but his order was not followed. The commander of the Southern Command gave an instruction to prepare for a raid in Gaza but nearly nothing happened.
