The Shin Bet (ISA) published the main points of its October 7 investigation this evening (Tuesday), revealing critical failures that led to the organization's failure to warn of the Hamas attack and prevent the massacre.

According to the investigation, Shin Bet did not recognize the impending Hamas attack as a large-scale and widespread attack until the moment of the breakout, thus failing in its mission to provide a warning. The intelligence that was accumulated was not properly analyzed, and the organization did not attach sufficient weight to signs indicating an impending attack.

The Shin Bet listed the main reasons for the failure:

• Inadequate handling of intelligence information – Hamas’ “Jericho Wall” plan was identified as early as 2018 and 2022, but was not recognized as a credible threat.
• Lack of clear division of responsibility with the IDF – the Shin Bet did not understand its responsibility to warn of a broad military attack.
• Incorrect focus in the concept of counterterrorism – the Shin Bet concentrated on preventing terrorism and did not prepare for a military threat.
• Inadequate intelligence processing on the night of October 6-7 – no proper analysis of the preliminary indications was carried out.
• Failures in the control mechanisms – no external tests were carried out that could have helped uncover these failures.
• Overestimation of the strength of the barrier on the Gaza border – the Shin Bet believed that the IDF was well prepared and did not foresee the collapse of the defense.
• Overfocus on the situation Judea and Samaria – the Shin Bet estimated that Hamas would focus on the Judea and Samaria arena and not launch a comprehensive attack from the Gaza Strip.

The investigation also cites as catalysts for Hamas’s decision to go on the offensive the cumulative weight of the disturbances on the Temple Mount, the treatment of security prisoners (a clear allusion to the policy of former Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir) and the perception that Israeli society had been weakened due to the damage to social cohesion, against the backdrop of the dispute over the judicial reform issue.

The reason Hamas was able to arm itself without interference

The investigation suggests that Hamas was able to build a significant military force thanks to a number of Israeli policy failures, including policy of “silence for money” – the flow of Qatari funds to Hamas allowed it to strengthen militarily.

Israeli deterrence crumbled – the government’s moves allowed Hamas to understand that Israel would not take preventive action.

Avoidance of proactive offensive actions – the IDF and Shin Bet avoided carrying out significant strikes, which allowed Hamas to prepare for its invasions.

Was there a warning on the night before the massacre?

Around 01:00 on the morning of October 7, the Shin Bet published an intelligence report assessing that Hamas was not interested in an escalation. The report stated: "A series of signs that, in terms of severity, indicate that Hamas is preparing for an emergency. Alongside the aforementioned, there are indications of routine on the ground as well as maintaining restraint, with the 'agreement of understanding' having begun in the background and it is estimated that Hamas is not interested in an escalation and launching a military campaign at this time."

At 03:03, a general warning was issued about unusual Hamas activity, but it was not interpreted as preparation for a large-scale attack. By 04:30, 45 "SIMs" (Hamas communication networks) had been sactivated, but the event was not identified as preparation for an attack since additional SIMs had been used the previous year. An emergency meeting held at the Shin Bet at 04:30 indicated a concern for a small-scale kidnapping attempt– but it was not assessed that this was a large-scale attack in the making.

The Shin Bet added that a team of soldiers had been sent to the south and began preparing to face possible infiltration points into Israeli territory, in response to the possibility of an infiltration/kidnapping attack.

Gaps in recruitment and the use of human agents

Intelligence collection was damaged as a result of the narrowing of freedom of action in the Gaza Strip, which acted as a closed area and reduced the operational ability to attack the opponent's detection mechanisms. The investigation shows that despite this, the scope of intelligence sensors obtained in hundreds of different operations in recent years would have allowed for a better intelligence picture, had they been exhausted at night.

Gaps in recruitment and operation of human agents: In light of the lack of access to the field and working "from the sidelines" only, there were gaps in the recruitment and operation of human resources in a way that could have indicated or warned of unusual activity in the Gaza Strip. The Shin Bet reveals that in 2018, an operation that was uncovered in Khan Yunis and an operation to thwart a Hamas operative from an interregional direction exposed and significantly damaged the human resources infrastructure.

Although there was a recovery and sources were recruited on a large scale, the Shin Bet had difficulty exhausting the se capabilities due to the limitations of activity in the Gaza Strip, which placed a very high barrier to the recruitment and operation of human resources. This problem persisted for years and especially in recent years.

A gap in creating a competing research assessment and examining the question of whether these were false assumptions - the lack of posing a competing hypothesis to the leading assessment, according to which Hamas in the Gaza Strip is concentrating on setting Judea and Samaria on fire, in a way that would examine in depth the possibility that Hamas is willing to risk a major military action from Gaza.

The Shin Bet emphasized that the organization's research division clearly warned of the lack of deterrence that would lead Israel's various adversaries, including Hamas, to act with increasing boldness.

What did the Shin Bet do after the attack began?

When the attack broke out, the Shin Bet acted quickly: it established special operations units to manage the hostage crisis, identify missing persons, and thwart Hamas raiding squads. It conducted interrogations of captured Hamas terrorists, which yielded important information for the fighting forces.

Coordinated operations with the IDF and located terrorist cells that returned to the Gaza Strip after the attack. Deployed designated forces to various combat zones, including the north, in case of an infiltration of Hezbollah's Radwan's force from Lebanon.

Key lessons learned and actions already taken

To prevent a similar failure in the future, the Shin Bet is implementing comprehensive reforms, including establishing an "online" intelligence control unit -for analyzing information in real-time.

In addition, the Shin Bet is upgrading its research division - including establishing a mechanism for reviewing intelligence assessments. It established a "terrorist money" unit in cooperation with the IDF to thwart Hamas financing and a new investigation department ​​to handle Hamas detainees from the Gaza Strip.

It is also changing the deployment of intelligence collection units in the Gaza Strip to improve human intelligence, creating new warning models, in each counter-terrorism unit, and sharpening the division of responsibility with the IDF so that the IDF will bear some of the responsibility for warning of an impending war.

The Shin Bet concludes the investigation with an unequivocal statement: the organization failed to warn of the Hamas attack, and the failure stemmed from a series of incorrect professional and management decisions. The head of the Shin Bet stressed that the organization is committed to correcting the failures to prevent a similar disaster in the future.

The investigation has been presented to the Prime Minister, and further discussions are expected in the government,