Prof. Efraim Inbar is the president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security and the chairman of the Department of Strategy, Diplomacy, and Security at Shalem College. A professor (emeritus) of political science at Bar-Ilan University, he was also the founding director and long-time head of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA). This article is reposted from the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.
Two fundamental equations determine the outcome of every armed conflict. The first pertains to which party can impose a greater cost through the application of force. The second concerns which side can endure a greater degree of suffering. A people that struggles to endure pain and for whom the necessity of sacrifice in war is not clear has less chance of prevailing.
Middle Eastern context
This is certainly true in the Middle East, where the use of military force is written into the rules of the game. Moreover, the use of force enjoys widespread popular support. Following the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein was celebrated as a hero in the Arab world despite stories of abuses committed against the Kuwaiti population. Hamas’s invasion of Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 and the atrocities it committed garnered support from 70-80% of the Palestinian populace.
While Israel has developed superior military capabilities to impose costs on the Palestinian Arabs, it is imperative to acknowledge the Palestinian Arabs’ capacity to endure the severe toll of their violent confrontation with the Zionist movement. Their refusal to acknowledge the Jewish right to self-determination in the Land of Israel, coupled with sustained violent resistance despite the numerous severe blows they have suffered since 1948, renders the conflict intractable. The commitment to the principle of refugees returning to their homes and the ethos of “summud,” meaning “steadfastness” or “clinging to the land,” which has evolved among the Palestinian Arabs, remain powerful forces preventing territorial compromise between the two national movements.
Israeli society’s resilience
In Israel, the legitimacy of using force is similarly grounded in a prevailing perception of existential threats and a widespread understanding that military force constitutes the cornerstone of the state’s survival. The Israel Defense Forces consistently ranks as the most trusted institution in Israeli society, and military service is regarded as a vital societal value. The remarkable mobilization of reservists for the war effort immediately following the state’s colossal failure on Oct. 7 highlights the willingness of most Israelis to bear the necessary costs in the multi-front military confrontation into which Israel has been drawn. Furthermore, the large numbers of young people eager to enlist in combat units attests to Israeli society’s capacity to withstand the challenges of protracted conflict.
Nevertheless, one cannot avoid asking whether there are indications of a decline in Israeli national resilience after a year and a half of conflict. In the past as well, doubts were raised about the people’s ability to endure wars. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s decision to sign the Oslo Accords was partly influenced by his assessment that Israeli society no longer possessed the resilience to withstand the costs of violent conflict as previous generations had. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who grew up on Jabotinsky’s concept of the “Iron Wall,” said, “We are tired of winning wars.”
It appears that Israel’s political leadership, beyond political disagreements, may underestimate the actual level of social endurance and the populace’s willingness to pay the price for the preservation of the state.
The containment policy failure
A manifestation of this disconnect is reflected in Israel’s containment policy in the 21st century, which advocated for a restrained response to aggressions from Hamas or Hezbollah—a strategy that has proven to be a complete failure.
The logic of adopting a containment policy—contrary to Israel’s original security concept formulated by David Ben-Gurion—was very attractive, and both the political and military leadership were taken in by its allure.
Since the “Lebanese quagmire,” Israeli policymakers and senior IDF commanders increasingly factored in what they perceived as high public sensitivity to casualties when making decisions regarding military operations that necessitated ground incursions into enemy territory.
In 1983, after the IDF had been engaged in Lebanon for nearly a year and had incurred around 500 casualties, the “Parents Against Silence” movement emerged, advocating for the army’s withdrawal due to the war’s ongoing, seemingly futile nature and the mounting losses.
This movement inspired the “Four Mothers” movement that formed following the helicopter disaster in February 1997, when 73 soldiers perished when two helicopters collided in the air while transporting the troops to Lebanon. Justifying casualties in a conflict whose objectives lack broad national consensus or appear unattainable becomes increasingly challenging. These movements heightened awareness and sensitivity toward IDF casualties.
Lt. Gen. (ret.) Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon noted in his autobiography the hesitations within the IDF prior to “Operation Defensive Shield” (April 2002) to capture Judea and Samaria cities due to concerns about potential casualties. Following the 2006 Lebanon War, Maj. Gen. Elazar Stern lamented the exaggerated sensitivity to loss of life, revealing that one of the battles was halted due to the number of casualties.
Israel’s restrained responses to repeated missile attacks from Gaza were also influenced by this consideration.
The public understands the necessity of force
In contrast, the Israeli public has instinctively recognized that the willingness to escalate violence is essential for achieving victory and deterrence. Escalation is a competition in risk-taking and signals determination and willingness to incur greater costs. Over time, containment conveys a reluctance to engage in military confrontation, which may be perceived as a manifestation of weakness in a region where political culture values the use of force.
The paradox lies in the fact that containment, while appearing successful, over time fosters complacency and creates conditions conducive to deterrence failures and painful strategic surprises. The Hamas attack on Oct. 7 exemplifies this phenomenon. Moreover, the policy of restraint normalizes the use of force by Israel’s adversaries, facilitating an increase in the intensity of violence directed against Israel over time. Indeed, the containment policy has generated significant frustration among the Israeli public, particularly in communities subjected to years of rocket fire. The expectation was that the IDF would, as it had in the past, deliver a decisive blow to those challenging it and eliminate the threat.
The onset of the “Swords of Iron” war highlighted the strategic miscalculations of both the political and military leadership and revealed errors in assessing national resilience.
1. Reserve soldiers turned up for duty in very high numbers, and civil society showed impressive resourcefulness.
2. A random review of the eulogies given in memory of the fallen shows an admirable patriotic spirit.
3. A considerable segment of Israeli society is willing to make great sacrifices to protect the homeland. Public opinion polls conducted after previous escalations in Gaza indicated that a majority of the public was dissatisfied with the failure to secure decisive victory and demonstrated a willingness to continue fighting and escalate the use of force.
The shift in focus to the hostage crisis
As the conflict has dragged on, Israel increasingly found itself drawn into addressing the great tragedy of the war—the hostages abducted by Hamas—due to both Hamas’s psychological warfare and, at the same time, a sophisticated and very well-funded domestic campaign, partly motivated by deep animosity toward Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
In a period of intense political division following attempts to enact judicial reform, this campaign led to a prevailing belief among most Israeli society that the immediate and primary objective of the war should be the return of the hostages rather than the defeat of Hamas and the dismantling of its governance in Gaza. The tension between these two objectives became evident from the onset of the conflict, with indications that the government prioritized the latter objective. The growing emotional outcry within Israeli society surrounding the hostage issue contributed to an erosion of commitment to the eradication of Hamas from Gaza.
A question of national resilience
Does the current public sentiment arise from excessive emotionality and signal a turning point in national resilience?
It remains challenging to ascertain at this juncture. The values of mutual responsibility and genuine humanitarian concern for the suffering of hostages are undeniably important values. So too is the principle that when faced with certain danger—such as the suffering of hostages—and potential danger—such as future terror attacks or the strengthening of Hamas—priority should be given to addressing the certain danger.
Historically, Israel has released terrorists with blood on their hands who posed future risks to Israeli lives. However, the calls from various officials—both senior and junior—to release the hostages “at any cost” and cease hostilities as demanded by Hamas raise significant concerns. Assertions that “Israel will not recover without the return of all hostages” reveal a lack of proportionality and historical perspective. The growing intolerance toward those who question the prudence of the hostage negotiation is particularly troubling.
The difficulty in acknowledging the moral argument, established in Jewish law, that “captives are not to be ransomed for more than their value,” and the necessity to consider long-term implications in hostage situations do not bode well for the resilience of Israeli society in similar situations in the future. Has Israeli society succumbed to understandable emotions without engaging in rational deliberation? In the context of the hostage affair, has Israel prioritized individual welfare over the collective good?
The answers to these questions are not self-evident, particularly given that the issue of national resilience is intricately linked to the political divisions within the country and the legitimacy lent to the use of force. The images coming out of Israel at present do not convey determination or strength. Time will reveal how Israeli society, which has thus far withstood formidable wartime challenges, will navigate this critical juncture.
