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Sarit Zahavi and Tal Beerihead the Alma Research Center whose goal is making in-depth geopolitical knowledge about the Middle East accessible to English speakers.
On January 26, the 60-day ceasefire between Israel, Lebanon, and Hezbollah ended. A ceasefire extension until February 18th was announced last night, following clashes that continued throughout the day between IDF forces remaining in Lebanon and Lebanese attempting to return to villages in southern Lebanon. On the Lebanese side, the Ministry of Health reported over 20 casualties. We estimate that Hezbollah operatives were physically present on the ground, mingled indistinguishably among the returnees. Throughout the convoys of returnees, Hezbollah flags and posters of Nasrallah, the former Hezbollah leader, were visible everywhere.
On the Israeli side—in areas adjacent to the border, most residents are currently refraining from returning to their homes, as it is unclear whether the Lebanese government will uphold its commitment to disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River as per UN Resolution 1701.
According to the ceasefire agreement, the IDF was supposed to completely withdraw from Lebanon yesterday, while the Lebanese army was supposed to deploy in all areas adjacent to the border, together with UNIFIL, and begin the process of disarming Hezbollah.
The situation:
Israel negotiated the extension of the ceasefire due to the Lebanese army’s inadequate deployment on the ground, which allowed Hezbollah’s Shiite base to breach the erected roadblocks and gain incentives to return with ease. But more importantly, the Lebanese army is not engaged in disarming Hezbollah, neither in the areas adjacent to the border where the IDF is located nor in areas south of the Litani that the IDF did not reach in its maneuver.
Hezbollah supported and encouraged returnee activities while urging its Shiite base to return. These were not spontaneous events, but planned ones, with early announcements of organization, defined meeting hours, gathering sites, entry routes, and the like. It’s conceivable that Hezbollah paid some of the attendees in advance.
In parallel, the new president of Lebanon, Joseph Aoun, issued a statement that avoided addressing the breaches of the LAF’s barriers by Hezbollah supporters.
Implications:
Hezbollah seeks to incite conflict and orchestrate incidents that result in harm to the Lebanese. This is classic fuel for Hezbollah’s propaganda campaign: “Lebanese citizens want to return to their land and must be protected…” From Hezbollah’s perspective, this strengthens their justification for their presence, arguing that the Lebanese army is unable to adequately protect the “civilians” on its own. The equation of “the people-army-resistance” is more relevant than ever… Hezbollah presents the situation as an aid to the Lebanese army.
The pictures of the events with the Shiite base waving Hezbollah flags and Nasrallah’s pictures are a platform to reinforce the “picture of victory” that Hezbollah so desperately wants to present to internal public opinion in Lebanon.
In his statement, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun reinforced—whether intentionally or not—the concept of “people-army-resistance.” This idea is a key element of Hezbollah’s propaganda campaign, which over the years has justified, from Hezbollah’s viewpoint, its role as an additional military force in Lebanon. In light of recent events, Hezbollah reiterated this narrative within the last 24 hours.
The Lebanese army failed to carry out its mission of preventing the events and the descent of the Shiite population to the south (in some cases it seemed that it could not and did not want to do so).
It should be emphasized that such events are a potential platform for terrorist activity against IDF forces (planned/accidental).
What needs to be done?
The most important question today is whether the new president, Joseph Aoun, is capable of bringing about fundamental change in Lebanon.
Working assumptions:
There is no easy solution for Israel under the current agreement and situation. Israel’s military operation in Lebanon did not attempt nor lead to the complete elimination of Hezbollah. Therefore, Israel will have to choose the “lesser of two evils.”
At present, Hezbollah does not want a war against Israel. It needs time to repair the military damage it suffered and the civilian damage it caused to its base (in southern Lebanon, in the Dahiya in Beirut, and in the Bekaa Valley).
The Lebanese army does not want and perhaps cannot confront Hezbollah.
Hezbollah wants to capture filmed frictions between Lebanese “citizens” and the IDF, including casualties.
Central recommendation:
A policy of maximum pressure on the Lebanese government, mainly through the US administration, with two main goals:
1. Neutralizing and dismantling the “people” (state) component of the “people-army-resistance” equation and isolating Hezbollah.
2. Actively preventing Iranian intervention in Lebanon.
The risk:
Sanctions on the state of Lebanon could steer it into the hands of Iran, which would be the one to provide the assistance – military, civilian, and financial.
Details of the actions to be taken in light of the recommendation:
-Pressure on the Lebanese President (Joseph Aoun) and the elected Lebanese Prime Minister (Nouhad Salam) to form a government without Hezbollah. This is critical for the future.
-Severing Lebanon’s diplomatic relations with Iran.
-Banning the landing of Iranian aircraft/docking of Iranian ships.
-Closing all of Hezbollah’s money lifelines– declaring Hezbollah a terrorist organization within Lebanon, closing Hezbollah’s banks (al-Qard al-Hassan) in Lebanon.
-Establishing a deadline for Hezbollah to be disarmed by the Lebanese army—essentially a deadline for implementing Resolution 1701—along with presenting evidence (the deadline in the current agreement is only for the withdrawal of the IDF and not for the disarmament of Hezbollah).
-Creating a bank of demands from the Lebanese government in exchange for US or international assistance, especially with regard to military assistance to the Lebanese army. For years, the Lebanese army has received billions of dollars in US and Western assistance without complying with international resolutions. This situation must end.
In light of this, examining the types of assistance provided to the Lebanese army so that they meet the challenges it faces but do not endanger Israel if the Lebanese system collapses. For example, the Lebanese army does not need anti-tank missiles as supplied by France several years ago.
As long as the IDF remains in Lebanon (currently until February 18, 2025):
A clear definition of the effective mission.
-Providing clear tools for the forces to fulfill their mission, including freedom of action while being willing to pay international prices if Lebanese are killed.
-A clear directive to create a perimeter for the security of our forces that does not allow physical proximity to them or the border, preventing the forces from getting accustomed to the proximity of “civilians.”
Since this is a terrorist organization that fundamentally seeks to harm Israel, in the event of an attack against an IDF force, including the possibility of kidnapping soldiers, Israel must define levels of response (not only in southern Lebanon, but also targeting Hezbollah leadership).
At the intelligence level—specifically analyzing the demographic segmentation of Lebanese army divisions—what is the demographic breakdown within the Border Guard divisions or intervention battalions of the Lebanese army?
It is crucial to identify which Lebanese force is most suitable for deployment in the south, from a demographic perspective, and to ensure that this force has no connections with Hezbollah. Therefore, our intention is to establish a force that will, demographically, include as few Shiites as possible among its soldiers and in command positions. In our assessment, a division with a significant majority of Shiites or Shiite commanders in senior roles will not be effective in the mission of disarming Hezbollah.